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UTILITY, THE GOOD AND CIVIC
HAPPINESS: A CATHOLIC CRITIQUE OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS
MARK A. SARGENTt
INTRODUCTION
One of the dominant modes of discourse in the legal academy
today is that of the law and economics movement. Having long
ago burst the bounds of market-oriented subject areas such as
contracts, property, business associations, and antitrust, law and
economics has tackled everything from family law to criminal law
to constitutional law.' The discipline not only reconceptualized
those spheres of experience as markets, but has also invaded the
traditional spheres of political theory and jurisprudence to
redefine the proper role of law.
Its goal in all these spheres is not just descriptive or
analytic. Law and economics has become prescriptive or
normative, employing the concept of social welfare as a
substitute for more traditional notions of fairness, morality, or
justice in defining what legal rules should be preferred. In its
view, the goal of law and individual legal rules should be the
maximization of social welfare as an aggregate of the preferences
or utilities of individuals, whatever they may be.' A legal rule
maximizes social welfare to the extent it maximizes, in the
t Dean and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. Many thanks
to the participants in a faculty workshop at St. John's University School of Law and
in a conference on Taking Christian Legal Thought Seriously, held in San Francisco
in January, 2005, where I presented drafts of this paper.
' See Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic
Analysis of Law (John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 53, 1998)
(discussing the growth of the law and economics movement beyond its original
concerns), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs-51-75/
53.Posner.Values.pdf.
2 See discussion infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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aggregate, individual preferences or utilities, and hence the well-
being of individuals.3
This concept of social welfare is much broader than the
wealth maximization norm originally associated with law and
economics, which asserted prescriptively that "law should seek to
increase social wealth, as measured by the dollar equivalents of
everything in society."4 It rests instead on a more comprehensive
notion of what an individual might value, and can include not
just goods, services, or power-wealth in the narrow sense-but
also "environmental amenities, personally held notions of
fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for others,"5 and even a "taste
for a notion of fairness. 6 Even this more comprehensive concept
of utility, however, avoids any attempt to distinguish among
preferences in terms of relative value or worth. Preferences are
what they are, and an individual's well-being depends entirely on
legal rules' ability to enable individuals to realize their
preferences. One preference, or end, is as good as any other.
There is certainly no hierarchy of ends.7 Law and economics,
thus, is value-neutral; it is emphatically not a meditation upon
the Good.
Law and economics does assume, however, that economic
actors are rational in the pursuit of their preferences.8 According
to rational choice theory, they will make choices that maximize
their ability to achieve their ends. 9 Law and economics simply
does not make judgments about the rationality of those ends, nor
3 See id.
4 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 208, 209 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds.,
2001).
5 Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18 (2002); see
id. at 35-36 n.41 (discussing how the broader concept of utility maximization has
challenged wealth maximization in law and economic analysis); see also infra note
29 and accompanying text.
6 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 21.
7 See Don Herzog, Externalities and Other Parasites, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 895, 900
(2000) (setting forth a critical analysis of this aspect of law and economics).
' See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (2004)
(stating that economists generally take the view that actors are forward-looking and
"rational").
9 See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14
(1976) (discussing this core assumption of neoclassical economics and law and
economics). The author notes that "all human behavior can be viewed as involving
participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and
accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of
markets." Id.
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does it judge them against a set of values. In fact, it repudiates
judgment about those ends or about the effects of legal rules, in
terms of "fairness" or, presumably, any other value extrinsic to
the individuals' preferences.' ° When being prescriptive, law and
economics is prescriptive only in its own terms-maximization of
social welfare conceived of as the aggregation of individual utility
maximizations -and not through the application of moral
norms developed philosophically or through religious beliefs.
If that is true, what possible relationship can there be
between law and economics and a jurisprudence grounded in
Catholicism? A Catholic jurisprudence may draw on different
sources of inspiration such as Scripture, natural law, Thomas
Aquinas, the Magisterium of the Church, Catholic social thought,
or any combination of those approaches; but all presume the
knowability of the Good. While recognizing that no human
social, political, or legal arrangements in the fallen world can
embody the Good, Catholic thought hardly shares the
indifference to ends central to the utility maximization norm. A
Catholic jurisprudence ultimately will be about ends. It will
make judgments about the values implicit in those ends, and will
critique and prescribe legal rules on the basis of those judgments.
Nothing could be less like law and economics.
If that is true, should it be said that law and economics and a
Catholic jurisprudence are in conflict, or at least engaged in
fundamentally different enterprises? This paper will address
that question first, in Part I, by elaborating upon the irrelevance
of values in both the descriptive and prescriptive modes of law
and economics. Part II will describe an argument by Stephen
Bainbridge, a noted Catholic law and economics scholar, who
believes that law and economics possesses a deep affinity, or at
least consistency, with the Catholic worldview.'2 In Part III, I
will argue, in contrast to Bainbridge, that law and economics, at
least in its prescriptive mode, while useful, is ultimately
inadequate from a Catholic jurisprudential perspective. I will
'0 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 52-58 (arguing against the use of
concepts of fairness, or any other standard extrinsic to individuals' preferences, as a
measure of well-being and social welfare); see also infra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
" See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 26 (stating that "value judgments
are involved in aggregating different individuals' well-being into a single measure of
social welfare"). As to the nature of those value judgments, see infra note 16.
12 See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 221-23.
38 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:35
conclude by urging greater attention to a richer, and Catholic-
inspired conception of economics.
I. THE IRRELEVANCE OF VALUES
The irrelevance of judgments about values to rational choice
theory is one of its defining characteristics. In rational choice
theory's world of utility-maximizing individuals engaged in
market relations, values are merely data. They are simply
economic actors' preferences or tastes, and of little importance for
purposes of economic analysis. The key point is that self-
interest, however defined, rules in the ideal world of the market.
Even altruism-an apparent contradiction to self-interest-is
merely disguised selfishness. The human agent's welfare is
measured solely by the extent to which those preferences are
satisfied: "How well-off an individual is, is the same thing as
how well satisfied an individual's preferences are. Orthodox
normative economics consequently identifies welfare and
preference satisfaction."13  The economist does not make
judgments of value about those preferences. 14 The only judgment
the economist can sustain is that of efficiency, which is "a concept
that captures aggregate effects of policies on individuals' well-
being"'5 or, in simple terms, acting 'without wasting money."' 16
13 Luigino Bruni, The 'Technology of Happiness" and the Tradition of Economic
Science, 26 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 1, 37 (2004).
14 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 421-22 ('The idea of an analyst
substituting his or her own conception of what individuals should value for the
actual views of the individuals themselves conflicts with individuals' basic autonomy
and freedom."). Note that Kaplow and Shavell make this bold moral assertion
without any elaboration whatsoever. Do they mean that individuals' preferences are
never subject to moral critique? If not, what makes any moral position better or
more important than any other, including the one they assert here? Why should this
rather simple libertarianism operate as a, indeed the, governing moral principle?
Kaplan and Shavell, to their credit, do acknowledge that their neutral position on
preferences, and the whole approach of welfare economics, "involves value
judgments." Id. at 25.
First, value judgments underlie the assumptions that social welfare
depends on individuals' well-being, that this dependence is positive, and
that factors unrelated to individuals' well-being are irrelevant. In other
words, to adopt welfare economics is to adopt the moral position that one
should be concerned, positively and exclusively, with individuals' well-
being.
Id. at 25-26. Paradoxically, therefore, the position that the morality or immorality of
ends is irrelevant is defined as a moral position, though not defended as such in
philosophical terms.
"5 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 37.
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Economists thus seem to be making relatively modest
claims. Rational choice theory is simply a useful tool for
predicting how people will respond to choices; it "emphatically is
not a moral norm,"'7 and is essentially descriptive in its function.
Thus, Richard Posner's claim that homo economicus 'is a person
whose behavior is completely determined by incentives; his
rationality is no different from that of a pigeon or a rat, '' 8 does
not pretend to be a moral or a normative statement. It purports
only to be a description of the autonomous individual's practice of
making rational choices that maximize her preferences.
This is not to suggest, however, that economics is non-
normative. Indeed, normative economics is most concerned with
law. The body of legal theory known as law and economics has
both descriptive-or positive-and normative-or prescriptive-
dimensions in the questions it asks about legal rules.1 9 As one
leading law and economics theorist, Steven Shavell, puts it in a
basic, mainstream law and economics textbook: one type of
question is descriptive, concerning the effects of legal rules on
behavior and outcomes. For example, will liability for causing
car accidents result in fewer accidents? The other type of
question is normative, concerning the social desirability of legal
rules. Thus, we might ask whether liability for car accidents is
socially desirable, given its effect on the incidence of accidents,
the compensation of accident victims, and the costs of the legal
system.2 °
Whether something is "socially desirable" depends on
whether it maximizes social welfare. The concept of social
welfare used in law and economics derives from rational choice
theory and its value-neutral position on individual preferences in
16 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 210 (quoting Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right
Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
817, 817 (1989)).
1" Id. at 217.
'8 Id. (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 382
(1990)).
'9 See MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS OR How ECONOMISTS
EXPLAIN 129-34 (1980) (analyzing the distinction between these two aspects of
economics and emphasizing that the boundary between the two is not absolute); see
also Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and
Economics, 18 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 259 (2004) (discussing the more recent
methodological debates within law and economics about positive, normative, and
now "functional", approaches).
20 See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 1.
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applying the utility maximization norm. In defining the law and
economics' understanding of social welfare, Shavell explains that
the notion of the utility or well-being of a person is general and
includes everything a person cares about, and that the concept of
a measure of social welfare is built up from the utilities of
individuals and is presumed not to depend on factors other than
their utilities.2'
Thus, the measure of social welfare is a function of the
preferences of the rational, utility-maximizing individuals
affected by a legal rule because fairness and the efficient
maximization of individual utilities are apples and oranges;
considerations of fairness-or any other deontological principle-
which are frequently a basis for normative evaluation of legal
rules, are irrelevant. Notions of fairness, Shavell argues, are
typically not defined in terms of the well-being of individuals and
are, in fact, not dependent on the consequences of their use. For
instance, the idea that punishment should reflect the gravity of
the act is not premised on how proportionality of the punishment
affects the well-being of any person or on whether it promotes
deterrence or incapacitation. Because the goal of satisfying
notions of fairness is different from advancing the utilities of
individuals, pursuit of the goal can lead to the reduction of
individuals' well-being.
This is hardly a desirable outcome in Shavell's view. Indeed,
in principle, the pursuit of any notion of the social good that is
not based positively and exclusively on the well-being of
individuals will, in some circumstances, make everyone worse off:
all individuals will want policy A to be chosen over policy B, yet
the notion of the social good will require B to be chosen. This
result implies that a person who wants to respect the unanimous
choices of individuals must, on grounds of consistency, reject any
notion of the social good that does not depend positively and
exclusively on the utilities of individuals. 23  From Shavell's
perspective, the introduction of moral principles into decision-
making is almost perverse, at least when the choices of the
individuals involved in a transaction are thereby disregarded.24
21 See id. at 596-97.
22 See id. at 608-12.
23 See id. at 611; see also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 16, 24-28
(elaborating and defending these arguments at much greater length).
24 See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 604-05.
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Fairness, Shavell concedes, may have some limited,
instrumental uses in economic analysis of law. For example,
individuals may have a "taste" or preference for fairness, such as
a desire to have the punishment fit the crime.25 That taste enters
into the economic analysis, however, as just another individual
utility, and is not in any sense privileged. "Fairness" is not a
separate normative consideration external to or superior to the
efficiency analysis. As Shavell puts it, fairness would not have
normative weight independently of whether individuals happen
to have a taste for satisfaction of the notions of fairness.26
Shavell is grateful, however, that notions of fairness do exist in
society; were people not to have moral notions instilled in them,
it is apparent that society as we know it could not function.
These notions are actually very useful from the point of view of
welfare economics, so it is desirable that individuals believe in
these notions of fairness and that social resources be employed to
instill them.27 Shavell's concession is thus quite limited. Shavell
concludes that whatever usefulness such notions might have,
usefulness does not imply that an analyst, in thinking about
legal policy, should give a notion of fairness independent weight
of its own.28
This principle of strict adherence to the utility maximization
norm, however, should not be regarded as methodological
modesty, or as recognition of a limit on the usefulness or scope of
economic analysis of law. To the contrary, it is an aggressive,
almost imperialistic assumption that fairness, or other
deontological principles applied in traditional jurisprudence and
philosophy, is inferior to welfare economics, and should be
supplanted. In short, the norm is central to law and economics'
conception of a better society.
Despite its analytical purity, the categorical assumption of
the supremacy of the utility maximization norm has been
qualified somewhat in the law and economics literature. In the
course of a defense of the norm, Bainbridge acknowledges that:
25 See id. at 601; see also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 21.
26 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 21.
27 See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 608-09.
28 See id. at 608, 610; see also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 21-22
("[Pihilosophers' or policy analysts' views of which notions of fairness should be
endorsed by members of an enlightened society are irrelevant.").
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Almost from the beginning .... important law and economics
scholars asserted that the wealth maximization norm could be
trumped by what Guido Calabresi called "Other Justice" norms.
That position now prevails in the law and economics
community. Even Judge Posner concedes (albeit with
qualifications) that economic analysis sometimes can be
trumped by noneconomic norms.29
This concession, however, tends to be a grudging one. While
recognizing in theory that "Other Justice" norms should
sometimes prevail in the evaluation of legal rules, economists
often emphasize what Bainbridge calls "the thorny problem of
implementation."3 °  For example, law and economics scholars
frequently employ public choice theory to show that legislatively
created legal rules reflect the preferences of intensely focused
interest groups with high stakes in the outcome, rather than the
interests of larger, more diffuse groups, such as consumers or
public shareholders, whose interests legislators theoretically
should be protecting.31 This kind of problem can lead a theorist
such as Bainbridge to conclude, "although in theory I
acknowledge the need to permit other normative values to trump
wealth maximization, in practice I am deeply suspicious of claims
that Other Justice norms should prevail. 32  Assertions of
fairness, "the public interest," social justice, and equality thus
are often perceived within the law and economics tradition as
masks for the self-interest, as rhetorical dodges deflecting
attention from the play of conflicting interests.
How does all this fit with a Catholic perspective on law? A
useful basis of comparison may be between law and economics
and Catholic social thought.33 Because of their shared concern
with many of the same issues-the nature of property, the
purpose and proper functioning of economic life, the relationship
29 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 212.
30 Id. at 213.
31 See J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 101-11 (Eric Posner ed., 1999) (discussing public choice theory
generally).
32 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 213.
33 The literature on Catholic social thought is enormous, and need not be cited
here. An excellent overview is CHARLES E. CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING:
1891-PRESENT (2002). The application of Catholic social thought to jurisprudence
and to specific problems in law, however, is a relatively recent development, and a
literature is just now developing. See, e.g., Symposium on Catholic Social Thought
and the Law, 1 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 201 (2004).
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of the state to the economy, the relationship of superior and
subsidiary authorities, and much more-it can be said that
Catholic social thought and law and economics are playing in the
same field. But do they have any relationship beyond that?
At first blush, there would not seem to be an important place
for Catholic social thought, with its insistence on evaluating
social arrangements in accordance with key moral and spiritual
principles, in the law and economics universe. In the Catholic
universe, the nature of ends or preferences is not irrelevant.
Perhaps Catholic social thought can, at best, serve as a source of
one of those elusive "Other Justice" considerations that, at least
theoretically, trump the utility maximization norm, especially in
non-market contexts. It may reflect a taste or preference within
an individual's utility determination. It may serve merely as a
means for guiding the distribution of wealth after economics
resolves the serious questions of wealth creation.
Fundamentally, however, the complex of interlinked assumptions
about human nature, the nature of the common good, and the
proper measure of a just economy and just society that constitute
Catholic social thought are of marginal relevance to law and
economics.
There is, however, a more sanguine view of their possible
relationship.
II. A CATHOLIC DEFENSE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
There is a body of Catholic opinion that asserts a deep
consistency between Catholic thinking about the economy and
society and neoclassical economics in general, and law and
economics in particular. Most notable is the work of Michael
Novak and Stephen Bainbridge.
I have considered Novak's claims elsewhere,34 and will not
elaborate on them here, but I will emphasize his key points,
which are actually quite simple. Novak asserts that the
conception of human dignity essential to Catholic thought
requires a robust conception of human freedom. Human
freedom, he argues, is found only in the democratic capitalist
system that maintains the separate sovereignty of the economic,
political, and cultural/associative spheres. Only this full
3 See generally Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in
Catholic Social Thought, 1 J. CATH. SOc. THOUGHT 561, 574-81 (2004).
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elaboration of the principle of sphere separation allows the
market to operate freely and efficiently without the distortions
created by the intervention of the state, which Novak often refers
to as "Leviathan." Furthermore, only the operation of the market
will create the wealth needed to establish the material conditions
essential to the flourishing of the human person that Catholic
teaching regards as the goal of a just society. Any state attempt
to intervene in market relations or in the exercise of economic
liberty, for the purpose of wealth distribution or achieving "social
justice"-a term Novak derides-is not only an infringement on
human freedom-and hence dignity-but an undermining of the
goal of wealth maximization, the only legitimate goal, for Novak,
of the economic sphere.3 This line of reasoning is obviously
congruent with neoclassical economics and law and economics.
What is notable for my purposes here is Novak's insistence
that this economically-informed view of the world is "Catholic,"
and that Catholic or other Christian thinkers who criticize it are
crypto-socialists who do not understand their own religion.
According to Novak, those Catholic and other Christian thinkers
who have criticized his version of economics from a
communitarian perspective, contested neoclassical economics'
view of human nature, or insisted on the primacy of
distributional or other social justice goals, have distorted
Catholic and Christian values by injecting into them entirely
foreign and secular socialistic ideologies. Economic liberty,
wealth maximization, and the subordination of distributional
goals constitute for Novak not just good economics, but the true
Christian message. Indeed, he regards the democratic capitalist
system as a sign of God's grace in the world. 6
Bainbridge, an influential law and economics scholar
principally interested in the law of business associations and
securities regulation, has done original and provocative work
extending Novak's premises to law and economics per se,
something Novak has done only glancingly. Bainbridge's work
has extended from a general apologia for law and economics from
" See generally MICHAEL NOvAK, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL
INSTITUTIONS, FREEDOM WITH JUSTICE (2d ed. 2000); MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT
OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (rev. ed. 2000); MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY
OF THE CORPORATION (rev. ed. 1990); MICHAEL NOVAK, ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: THE CORPORATION AS IT OUGHT TO BE (1997).
36 See generally Sargent, supra note 34, at 574-81.
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a Catholic-and more broadly Christian-perspective, to specific
analyses showing how certain Catholic social thought critiques of
corporate governance and corporate law are both bad economics
and erroneous applications of Catholic social thought principles.
Bainbridge's apologia for law and economics rests partially
on the standard defenses:
. Legal sanctions constitute a cost for engaging in certain
activities, thus "changing a legal rule is no different from any
other change in price.
37
. A legal rule is thus "just as subject to analysis under price
theory as is the price of a commodity."
38
. "The bedrock principle of normative economic analysis is
wealth maximization; that is, law should seek to increase social
wealth, as measured by the dollar equivalents of everything in
society."
39
. Wealth maximization is crucial to implementation of the
efficiency principle. Understanding wealth maximization in
terms of efficiency "shifts the burden of proof to opponents of the
norm."
40
* While it must be acknowledged that "law and economics is an
instrumental mode of reasoning that must be constrained and
guided by exogenous norms," such as "Other Justice"
considerations, the implementation of such norms creates
serious problems. Public choice theory shows that, at least in
the legislative area, decisions made in the name of distributive
justice usually reflect only interest group pressures.
41
As just suggested, all of this is standard apologetics for law and
economics, and there is nothing particularly Catholic about it.
To his credit, however, Bainbridge offers a deeper defense that
does, in fact, attempt to draw on the Catholic worldview.
He does so by asking whether the wealth maximization
norm, and the rational choice theory that underpins it, can be
reconciled with Christianity: "How then can Christians associate
37 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 208; see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and
the Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILL. J.L. & INVESTMENT MGMT. 3 (2002);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought and the Corporation, 1 J. CATH.
Soc. THOUGHT 595 (2004); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and
the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43
VILL. L. REV. 741 (1998).
38 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 208.
31 Id. at 209.
40 Id. at 210. Note that Bainbridge prefers the standard of wealth maximization
rather than utility maximization, and uses it consistently in his Apologia.
41 Id.
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themselves with a normative principle explicitly intended to
maximize wealth and whose measurement of wealth includes
only those preferences having monetary values?"42  Note that
Bainbridge uses throughout his Apologia the narrower concept of
"wealth" rather than utility maximization.43  Bainbridge
recognizes correctly that it is the vision of human nature implicit
in rational choice theory that is at the heart of the question:
'Economic Man' is an autonomous individual who makes
rational choices that maximize his satisfactions. The question
before us is whether the economic view of human nature is
consistent with that of Christianity.""
Bainbridge's answer to that question is essentially twofold:
a non-theological and a theological answer. The non-theological
answer is, again, a standard law and economics argument.
"Economic Man," he emphasizes, "is not intended to describe real
people embedded in a real social order."45  The concept simply
provides a mechanism for describing how people choose between
alternatives.46 It presumes rationality in the decisions made by
people to satisfy their preferences-whatever those preferences
may be.47  As such, law and economics rests on an economic
model of behavior that adequately explains the behavior of people
engaged in exchange.48 It, thus, does not matter, concludes
42 Id. at 209.
43 Id. By rejecting the broader utility maximization principle, Bainbridge
presumably adopts a more modest position on law and economics' explanatory or
prescriptive power than Shavell, Kaplow, and others who favor the utility
maximization approach. It probably should not be assumed, however, that the
distinction between "utility" and "wealth" leads to a meaningful difference in their
sense of the scope of law and economics. As one critic has stated the problem:
Economic accounts routinely wobble between these two interpretations of
utility maximization. At some point in the story, one senses that the
account is following the first interpretation, motored by misanthropic glee:
the agents in question all seem single-mindedly devoted to pursuing their
own profit or power or pleasure. One objects-surely there's more to it than
that!-and the economist backtracks to the second interpretation, saying
patiently, "no, by utility maximization I just mean the formal structure,
any content will do." But then, within minutes-or paragraphs-we find
ourselves right back to the first interpretation.
Herzog, supra note 7, at 898-99.
Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 216.
4 Id. at 218.
6 Id.
47 See id. (explaining that rational choice theory is not a moral norm, but rather
a "benign" assumption that consumers have transitive preferences).
48 See id. at 218-19.
2005] CATHOLIC CRITIQUE OF LAWAND ECONOMICS 47
Bainbridge, that Economic Man is an imperfect model of human
behavior.49
Bainbridge's theological response is more original and raises
a question about his claim that Economic Man is just an
imperfect but useful model of human behavior. He returns to the
basic limitations of rational choice theory. The formation and
nature of human preferences is beyond economics. Bainbridge
writes:
Here's the kicker: price theory tells us how people will choose,
but as R.H. Coase notes, "it does not tell us why people choose
as they do. Why a man will take a risk of being killed [by
crossing a busy street] in order to obtain a sandwich is hidden
from [economists] even though we know that, if the risk is
increased sufficiently, he will forgo seeking that pleasure." In
other words, economics has no good account of the character or
origins of human preferences.
50
It is here, Bainbridge argues, the Christian faith "brings
something to the table."
Christianity is not a utopian faith but rather is quite realistic
about human beings. In particular, our central doctrine of the
Fall of Man tells a coherent story about the nature and origins
of human preferences in an unredeemed world. In my view, the
-assumptions about human behavior made by economists are
largely congruent with the fallen state of man. If Economic
Man is a fair description of Adam after the Fall, the rational-
choice model used in economics is not a bad model for predicting
the behavior of fallen men. At the same time, however, because
Christianity's account of how man fell and the consequences of
that Fall provide an answer to Coase's question about human
preferences, our faith gives Christian practitioners of economic
analysis a more fully realized account of human behavior.
51
Furthermore, Bainbridge argues that if Economic Man and
Fallen Man bear a rough equivalence, then law and economics
provides not only an accurate basis for modeling human
behavior, but a sound normative basis for ordering society. This
might, however, seem counterintuitive from a Christian
perspective, as Bainbridge acknowledges when he points out that
49 See id. at 218.
50 Id. at 222 (second alteration in original) (quoting R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW 5 (1988)).
51 Id.
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"Christians are called to a higher standard of behavior than that
of fallen man."52
However, it cannot be assumed that most people, whether
Christian or not, will overcome their fallen nature, and it should
not be believed that society actually can be organized on the
assumption that they will be able to do so. Bainbridge thus
argues that:
If the purpose of economic analysis is to predict how people will
respond to changes in legal rules, however, can we assume
Christian behavior by the masses of a secular and Godless
society? No realistic social order can assume "heroic or even
consistently virtuous behavior" by its citizens. A realistic social
order therefore must be designed around principles that fall
short of Christian ideals. In particular, the rules must not be
defined in ways that effectively require every citizen to be a
practicing Christian. Christian visions of justice therefore
cannot determine the rules of economic order. Instead, legal
rules and predictions about human behavior must assume the
fallen state of Man, which is precisely what I have tried to
suggest Economic Man permits us to do.
53
For Bainbridge, therefore, law and economics, while not precisely
"Christian" or "Catholic" itself, has an affinity with the Christian
view of the fallen nature of man, and hence, with a Christian
view of the constraints on human ability to create a just society.
There is certainly no tension between the two for Bainbridge, as
he concludes that "a Christian legal scholar may rely on both
positive and normative economic analysis with confidence that it
is both a powerful analytic tool and one that is consistent with
his or her walk with God. 54
Bainbridge's argument is impressive, both in its originality
and in its ambitious harmonization of law and economics and
Catholic Christianity. He has formed the argument in a subtler
and more convincing manner than Novak. But is he right?
III. THE LIMITS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Bainbridge's reconciliation of Christianity and Economic
Man is ingenious in its linking of rational choice theory, utility
maximization, and our fallen state. Human selfishness, for the
52 Id.
" Id. at 222-23.
54 Id. at 223.
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Christian, is one of the consequences of the Fall; rational utility
maximization thus may be an accurate way to describe how the
fallen will tend to act. There is perhaps an inconsistency
between Bainbridge's initial insistence that Economic Man and
rational choice theory simply constitute a useful predictive
model, rather than a description of human nature, and his
subsequent conclusion that in the Christian view, Economic Man
is actually the way people really are.
More troubling is the corollary of Bainbridge's equation of
the two. Even if we assume that Economic Man acts something
like Fallen Man as a descriptive matter, does this mean that the
prescriptive goal of economics-helping Economic/Fallen Man
maximize his preferences, whatever they are, as efficiently as
possible with the sum of those preferences being the sole
measure of social welfare-is also "Christian"? To be sure, Fallen
Man will act selfishly to pursue his own interests, and will do so
rationally to the extent possible, and a type of well-being will be
achieved through legal rules that efficiently maximize his utility,
i.e., help him get what he wants. For law and economics,
however, that is the end of the story. From a Catholic
perspective it cannot be. The reasons it cannot be the end of the
story suggest not only that Bainbridge's equation of Economic
Man and Fallen Man takes us only so far, but also that there are
serious tensions between the two worldviews' understandings of
the human person, the nature of civic happiness, and the purpose
of economics.
Note, however, that my identification of this tension, and
consequent skepticism about the ultimate value of law and
economics, does not presume that "economics" is irrelevant. To
the contrary, this analysis presumes that concepts of neoclassical
economics, such as rational choice, efficiency, game theory, rent-
seeking, the principal-agent problem, and much more "ought to
be in the toolkit of any self-respecting social or political
theorist,"55 whether Catholic or not. Indeed, there is nothing
Catholic about wasting money, and our moral responsibility for
faithful stewardship of God's earthly gifts requires
understanding and application of efficiency principles. The
question is how far can those concepts take us? Can they replace
55 Herzog, supra note 7, at 906.
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the Catholic moral tradition of meditation upon virtue and the
Good as a guide to decision-making in law?
Furthermore, recognizing the relevance of economics also
requires recognizing that the neoclassical economics from which
law and economics derives is not the only kind of economics.
Much as law and economics scholars such as Bainbridge and
Shavell draw on the theoretical framework of economists such as
Coase, Becker, Stigler, Friedman, and others, this analysis will
also draw on the work of economists, but economists of a very
different type. Notable among them are the Italian Catholic
economists Antonio Genovesi,5 6 Stefano Zamagni,7 Luigino
Bruni,58 and Benedetto Gui,59 who have articulated a vision of
economics as oriented toward production of civic happiness that
is deeply informed by Catholic social teaching. Much of the
following discussion reflects their work.
A Catholic critique of law and economics should proceed on
several distinct, albeit related levels. First, there is a
56 Genovesi was a principal figure of the 18th century Neapolitan enlightenment.
See Bruni, supra note 13, at 21 (discussing Genovesi's economic theory, particularly
his concept ofpubblica felict& ("public happiness")).
57 For representative works, see Stefano Zamagni, Humanising the Economy:
On the Relationship Between Catholic Social Thinking and Economic Discourse, in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: TWILIGHT OR RENAISSANCE? 149 (J.S. Boswell et al.
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Zamagni, Humanising the Economy], Stefano Zamagni, On
the Foundation and Meaning of the "Economy of Communion" Experience, in THE
ECONOMY OF COMMUNION, TOWARD A MULTIDIMENSIONAL ECONOMIC CULTURE 130
(Luigino Bruni ed., 2000), and Stefano Zamagni, The Market, Happiness and the
"Economics of Reciprocity," LIVING CITY, June 2004, at 16. See also his co-authored
work, LUIGINO BRUNI E STEFANO ZAMAGNI, ECONOMIA CIVILE: EFFICIENZA EQUITA,
FELICITA PUBBLICA (2004) [hereinafter BRUNI E ZAMAGNI, ECONOMIA CIVILE].
58 For representative works, see BRUNI E ZAMAGNI, ECONOMIA CIVILE, supra
note 57, LUIGINO BRUNI, L'ECONOMIA, LA FELICITA E GLI ALTRI: UN' INDAGINE SU
BENI E BENESSERE (2004), Bruni, supra note 13, ECONOMIA COME IMPEGNO CIVILE,
RELAZIONALITA BEN-ESSERE ED ECONOMIA DI COMMUNE (Luigino Bruni & Vittorio
Pelligra eds., 2002) [hereinafter ECONOMIA COME IMPEGNO CIVILE], ECONOMY OF
COMMUNION, TOWARD A MULTIDIMENSIONAL ECONOMIC CULTURE, supra note 57,
Luigino Bruni & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Values and Corporate Decision
Making: The Economy of Communion Project (forthcoming), Luigino Bruni, Economy
of Communion: Between Market and Solidarity, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT:
TWILIGHT OR RENAISSANCE?, supra note 57, at 239.
59 For representative works, see Benedetto Gui, Productive Organizations with
Ideal Aims and Personal Fulfillment: Interpersonal Relations and Horizons of
Meaning, in ECONOMY OF COMMUNION, TOWARD A MULTIDIMENSIONAL ECONOMIC
CULTURE, supra note 57, at 112, Luigino Bruni & Benedetto Gui, Quattro Parole Su
Economia e Communione, in ECONOMIA COME IMPEGNO CIVILE, supra note 58, at
191, and Benedetto Gui, Sharing That Builds Universal Brotherhood, LIVING CITY,
June 2004, at 20.
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foundational philosophical disagreement between rational choice
theorists and Catholic thinkers. Rational choice theory's-and
game theorists'-view of human nature and the purpose of life is
rooted in Hobbes. As Peter Berkowitz-a non-Catholic political
philosopher-has pointed out accurately, "[w]ith Hobbes..., the
game theorist supposes that the world is matter in motion and
nothing more; that there is no greatest good or ultimate aim, no
human perfection or salvation; that the primary and only salient
motive for human conduct is rational self-interest. '60 Opposed to
the quintessentially modern Hobbes-and his intellectual heirs
among economists-is the distinctly religious Catholic conception
of personhood: incarnational, capable of redemption, and
oriented toward salvation. Humans are fallen, but redeemable.
The human person is capable of more than utility maximization,
should not be regarded as interested only in utility maximization,
and may be judged in a moral framework that values something
greater than the autonomy needed to satisfy individual
preferences.
Second, rational choice theory and welfare economics assume
that the ends of action-the purposes of choices-are beyond the
ability of economics to evaluate normatively. Law and
economics, which is dependent for its analytical force on rational
choice theory, "disclaims all concern with the ends of action, 61
hence what I have described as the "irrelevance of values." In
contrast, the Catholic tradition, grounded in Aristotle and
developed through Aquinas, insists on the capacity of reason to
deliberate about ends and not just means. Ends-or
preferences-may be shaped by reason and directed toward the
Good.62 For Catholic thinkers, that end, the ultimate good, is
God,63 but the secularist can substitute alternative conceptions of
the Good. Law and economics' insistence on the irrelevance of
ends is a sharp break with both the Catholic and secular
Aristotelian tradition, making it ultimately inadequate from
those perspectives as a guide for deciding and acting.
60 Peter Berkowitz, The Futility of Utility, NEW REPUBLIC, June 5, 2000, at 44. I
am indebted to Michael Moreland for this reference.
61 DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 25-26 (1986).
62 For an excellent exposition of this insight, see an unpublished paper by
Michael P. Moreland, Homo Economicus and Catholic Social Thought 8-10.
63 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I., Q. 2, art. 3, at 14 (1947)
(1266-1273).
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Third, the concept of human flourishing central to Catholic
social thought is far richer and more complex than the utility
maximization norm of law and economics. Here, the difference is
once again rooted in Aristotle, particularly the Aristotelian
notion of "happiness," or eudaimonea. This notion is quite
different from the concept of "pleasure" derived from
utilitarianism and understood in neo-classical economics and law
and economics as the consequence of utility maximization. For
Aristotle, that pleasure is a transitory, neutral state; it does not
constitute subjective well-being, or happiness. Happiness is a
byproduct of being virtuous, in particular of practicing the civic
virtues.6 The civic virtues are particularly important because
the human person is inherently social, a key concept in Catholic
social thought as well as Aristotelian. In modern economic
terms, the human person is other-oriented and derives
satisfaction from amassing "social capital."
These Aristotelian notions were built into Catholic thought
about ethics and politics by Aquinas, 65 and, through him, into
Catholic social thought, with Catholic social thought's emphasis
on the relational nature of happiness, the obligations of
reciprocity, and the common good as a constraint on wealth and
property rights. They were brought into Catholic thinking about
economics by Antonio Genovesi, a cleric and principal figure of
the Neapolitan enlightenment of the 18th century, who used these
Aristotelian/Aquinian concepts to define the purpose of economics
as bringing about pubblica felicit&, or public happiness, in which
the goal of market relations is not simply to maximize the wealth
of each individual, but to secure the happiness of others and of
society in general. Genovesi recognizes that each individual will
pursue his own interests-act "rationally" in modern terms-but
if he only pursues his own interest, and ignores the civic virtues,
neither the individual nor society will achieve true happiness,
because happiness and virtue are bound inextricably. Luigino
Bruni explains this paradox in Genovesi's thinking:
6 For an explanation of how the concept of eudaimonia, articulated in
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, was elaborated by Genovesi as a guiding principle
for economics, see Bruni, supra note 13, at 27-29. For discussion of how Aristotle
linked happiness with the virtues to construct a concept of "human flourishing," see
id. at 27 nn.13-15.
65 See id. at 27.
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In a letter we find a very clear sentence synthesizing
Genovesi's theory of happiness as eudaimonia and its paradox,
"every man acts looking for his happiness, otherwise he would
be less of a man .... The more one acts for interest, the more, if
he is not mad, he must be virtuous. It is a universal law that it
is impossible to make our happiness without making others'
happiness." Here it is affirmed that man acts according to his
own "interest." Interest however means "happiness," and one
can only reach happiness/interest indirectly, by being virtuous.
Virtue here is civic virtue, that is, other-oriented, genuinely
social. Finally, happiness is a "by product" of this
virtuous/social behavior.66
Where economics went wrong, Bruni argues, is in the
decision to equate "happiness" with "pleasure," jettisoning the
Aristolelian/Aquinian connection between happiness and virtue,
particularly the civic virtues, for the sake of the value-neutral-
virtue-indifferent--concept of utility maximization. 67 This move
elevated purely instrumental tools such as rational choice theory,
utility maximization, and the concept of efficiency into the sum
total of economics, leaving no place for reasoned deliberation
about ends or consideration of the real sources of human
happiness-the virtues.
Fourth, economists inspired by Catholic social thought as
such contest the core assumption "that values are just a
datum, 68 and that 'some of the most intrinsically human
peculiarities of the economic agent such as his notions of justice,
honour, loyalty and also his vaguest hopes and illusions [are] pre-
economic data, or 'accidental deviations from the rational norm'
which reciprocally compensate within the vast body of data.'
69
Their presumption is that economic analysis needs to have some
account of how virtues such as benevolence, sympathy, trust, and
solidarity are crucial to the operation of the market. The key
aspect of all those virtues is that they are relational; they all
involve the individual's relationship with the other. This strikes
at the individualistic core of neoclassical economics, and law and
economics-the "sovereignty of individual preferences."7 °  This
66 Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
67 Id. at 36 ("The reductionism of happiness/eudaimonia to utility/pleasure is
the real break-point in this history of happiness in economics.").
68 Zamagni, Humanising the Economy, supra note 57, at 156.
69 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
70 Id. at 160.
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sovereignty presumes an individualistic anthropology, which, to
economists grounded in Catholic social thought, such as
Zamagni, "is inadequate because its vision of the concept of
person denies precisely what is essential to a person: interaction
with others and the relationship to others as a value per se."'" It
also presumes that humans are satisfied-"happy"-merely so
long as they have the freedom to choose. But that freedom is
purely individualistic, and not sufficient to produce happiness in
the Aristotelian sense. To Zamagni-and Catholic social
thought-true freedom is not merely the exercise o f choice, but
the incorporation of each person's "deep, vital need for the other.
It is the relation 'with' the other which is crucial to freedom, not
the relation 'to' others per se.... Robinson Crusoe may maximise
his own utility, by himself, but for him to be happy there must be
Friday. 72
CONCLUSION
Where does all this leave law and economics? Its descriptive
powers remain largely intact, but its expansive and exclusionist
prescriptive claims for how society and the economy should
operate largely collapse because its value-neutrality, indifference
to ends, and radical individualism provides no insight into what
is required for the happiness in which humans can truly flourish.
In short, law and economics provides useful descriptive and
analytic tools, but from a Catholic perspective they are just tools
of inherently limited value. Law and economics does not provide
an acceptable framework for determining what ought to be
because of the limits it imposes on its own capacity for moral
judgment and conceptualizing human happiness. As a result of
these self-imposed limitations, law and economics and Catholic
thinking about law do not so much conflict as diverge onto
separate paths.
Prescriptive law and economics begins and ends with social
welfare as the maximization of individual preferences. There is
no conception of the common good apart from the satisfaction of
individual preferences; indeed, it is believed that such
satisfaction is the only way to achieve civic happiness. This
relentless orientation toward the self, however, is ultimately
"' Id. at 161.
72 Id. at 163.
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antithetical to Catholic thinking about economic life, which
emphasizes reciprocity, other-orientation, the social nature of
happiness, and the promotion of civic virtue.73 The goal of a
Catholic economics is not the creation of a societas perfecta or a
communal utopia-Augustine taught us that perfection is for the
City of God, not the City of Man-but the creation of an economy
and society that is more virtuous, rather than less, and that the
world, while fallen, is capable of redemption.
73 As Pope John Paul II stated in his famous encyclical Evangelium Vitae, a
culture that "denies solidarity" often "takes the form of a veritable 'culture of death."'
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE 12 (1995) [hereinafter
EVANGELIUM VITAE], http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/john-paul iiencyclicals/
documents/hfjp-ii enc 25031995_evangelium-vitaeen.html. That culture, he
argued further, "is actively fostered by powerful cultural, economic and political
currents which encourage an idea of society excessively concerned with efficiency."
Id. At the heart of the "profound crisis of culture" is precisely the type of value
neutrality implicit in welfare economics and law and economics, a "scepticism in
relation to the very foundations of knowledge and ethics . . .which makes it
increasingly difficult to grasp clearly the meaning of what man is, the meaning of his
rights and his duties." EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra, at 11.
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